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Memory and Authenticity
Randolph Starn
University of California-Berkeley

Ten years ago Natalie Davis and I decided to put together a
special issue of Representations we would call "Memory and
Counter-Memory." When the issue appeared in the spring of 1989,
the click of discovery, the buzz of current interest, the echo of old
debates were becoming a roar; by the spring of 1993 when Stephen
Greenblatt and I offered a Berkeley graduate seminar on "Pasts in
the Present and the Institutionalizations of Memory," we were part
of a movement questioning proprietary claims over the past by history and historians. Only a few years later the movement has become an industry, with an extensive product line and, so we might
think, some worries about overproduction. Such is the short academic life-cycle at this fin de siecle, R to D, glimmer to glut.
The quick pace makes it easy to forget that the historical study
of collective memory is already in its second or third generation, or
even older, depending how the reckoning is done. Just to take French
examples one could start, say, with the work of Maurice Halbwachs,
then go on to the collective effort of Pierre Nora and his collaborators, before arriving at a current cluster of studies of remembering
and forgetting Vichy and the Algerian war. Ian Hacking has recently
argued that French positivist sciences of psychology began a "rewriting of the soul" in terms of memory in the 1870s, and Richard
Terdiman has located a consciousness-raising crisis of memory in
France much earlier in the nineteenth century. One way or another, a
rich corpus of histories of memory exists from which we may draw
some conclusions before rushing on, as it may be, like lemmings.'
Here is a sample list of basic propositions that seem to me established or reconfirmed by the memory literature I have read off
and on over several years:
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As in a classic, Aristotelian distinction, memory (mneme) is involuntary, memory that comes up unbidden, or a deliberate act of
recollection (anamnesis); although recent historical studies tend to
blur the distinction, as the ancients also did, they are mostly concerned with memory of the selective sort.
Individual memory may be of both kinds, but collective memory
is always constructed because, absent an ether of transcendental,
organic, or communal memory, people can't remember things they
haven't experienced.
Therefore, collective memory has no unmediated access to the
past but is about the articulation of identity from the vantage of the
present; it is continuously reconstructed rather than recalled pristine, and it attributes the causes and truths of things that it claims to
know.

Collective memory can best be characterized as a practice or a
set of practices rather than a faculty or an entity such as-these are
common suggestions-a storage bin, an aviary, a wax tablet, or a

palimpsest.'
To clinch these points could take whole tomes. But considering that

am fairly confident about being able to make the case, why can I
also be certain of resistance and feel it in myself besides? There's
evidently more to this feeling than my having listed propositions
without making arguments. Even Ockham's razor needs whetting by
argumentation, but the objections that come to mind go beyond
reasonable arguments. To begin with, I suspect that many people,
including perfectly respectable academics, want to obfuscate because memory proffers relief from humdrum history, a promise of
intimacy, access to "lived experience," critiques of official complacency or duplicity, and at the same time an imagined universality
that transcends everyday routines. This is nothing new, of course.
Nineteenth-century historicism wanted to recall the past into the
present; "living memory" was in all senses of the word a "medium"
of time travel, and there were and still are many frequent flyers. My
guess is that not even the most determined postmodernist sensibility can altogether resist this magic carpet.
If anything, programmatic postmodernist opposition to such
flights may have something to do with some kinds of objections I'm
anticipating. It is, for example, textbook Deconstruction that a positive claim hinges on some more or less encrypted Other, and this
means that deconstructed versions of memory will call up, ironically
or not, shadowy versions that are allegedly organic, unmediated,
whole, present, etc. But there are more pressing reasons for wanting
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol23/iss1/13
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to insist that the immediacy of memory matters. Insofar as twentieth-century traumas and horrors, to which the critical dismantling of
conventional knowledge is partly a response, lie beyond the limits
of representation, they have come to demarcate an auratic realm of
remembering and forgetting.' Add to this some usual suspects of
modern malaise-capitalism and commodification, depersonalization
and homogenization, mass media and mass culture-and we have
the incentive or desire for alternatives to which memory corresponds
and caters. Even irreverent critiques of the truth-claims of memory
often have an elegiac quality about them, not exactly nostalgic perhaps for any particular remembered tradition so much as for the
ability to believe in tradition at all.
At this point I want to shift to memory's Siamese twin, which is
not (for present purposes anyway) forgetting or silence or history
but authenticity. I want to do so because the notional careers of
memory and authenticity overlap so closely as to be practically inseparable. Lionel Trilling's account of the notion of authenticity
since Rousseau in a celebrated series of Harvard lectures could just
as well apply to parallel conceptions of memory. So, for example:

At the behest of the criterion of authenticity, much that was
once thought to make up the very fabric of culture has come to
seem of little account, mere fantasy or ritual, or downright falsification. Conversely, much that culture traditionally condemned
and sought to exclude is accorded a considerable moral authority by reason of the authenticity claimed for it, for example,
disorder, violence, and unreason
[A] marvelous generative
force [is] assigned to authenticity, which implies the downward
movement through all the cultural superstructures to someplace
where all movement ends, and begins. (Trilling 100)
.

.

.

Trilling went on to quote Wordsworth: "Points have we within all
our souls / Where all stand single" (105). He could have updated
these lines with the existentialists' inauthenticity as an alleged loss
of this focus and its dissipation in the "average everyday" of mindless occupations and mass culture. In any case, memory understood
as individualized and circumscribed, whether by a person or a special group, would be authenticity's analogue. It would bear authentic testimony against distortion or dilution or excision by institutional orthodoxy.
Like memory holding forth on its purity, authenticity in this
sense is an easy target. I have a bulging file of authenticity jokes.
Published by New Prairie Press
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Adorno mocked an existentialist jargon of authenticity as "the
Wurlitzer organ of the spirit" (17). In Umberto Eco's travels in
hyperreality, paying customers at Forest Lawns cemetery are told
that the stained glass "Last Supper" is more authentic than
Leonardo's original. According to one of the greatest students of
pop culture, Sam Goldwyn, "Authenticity is everything; if you can
fake it, you've got it made" (Orvell 12). A review article on the recent
Jane Austen film fad begins with a mind-boggling headline: "In the
Authenticity Game, Only a Few Win."' The catch is that, like memory
again, authenticity never seems to lose altogether; it's a bottom line
that is very hard to erase. David Lowenthal, the Sisyphus of a long
campaign against what he calls our "mania" for authenticity, is a
case in point. "In place of ignorance or philistinism," Lowenthal
wrote more than fifteen years ago, "we are now so besotted by the
past that anything goes so long as it is 'authentic.' In what purports
to be history
'authenticity' means fidelity to feeling that swamps
facts in anachronistic invention; a search for roots so engage as to
include very little of the actual past" (The Past 231). But no sooner
has Lowenthal got uphill on faking in art and architecture than "false
authenticity and inauthentic truth" slip past him in musical performances, ethnic cookery, airport art, identity politics, clothing labels,
and The Lowenthal Album, "a leather textured library edition
registered in the owner's name, serially numbered, and accompanied
with a Certificate of Authenticity" ("Art and Authenticity" 646). In
his most recent book Lowenthal fights the same uphill battle all over
again.
In effect, strict conceptions of memory and authenticity make it
difficult if not impossible to take one or the other seriously. But this
is to be, so to speak, immemorious about both authenticity and
memory. The strict constructions are, after all, historically shallow
and short. For authenticity they arise somewhere between the late
eighteenth-century question "Born Originals, how comes it to pass
that we die Copies?" and various versions of a fall from some pristine state of nature and condition of the soul.' The fixation on memory
as a key to individual and social identity comes later, as I have noted
in citing Hacking and Terdiman on the French case. In this century
Halbwachs's influential analysis of "les cadres sociaux" 'the social
framework' within which memory hinges on "the support of a group
delimited in space and time" was actually part of an argument for the
moderating accountability of history. Even the widespread misreading of his work as a celebration of collective memory was delayed by
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol23/iss1/13
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the war and his death at the hands of the Nazis.6 I'm not impressed
by longue duree versions of the preeminence of memory, from Augustine or even Hesiod, because they are too generic to make specific historical sense.'
Before the later eighteenth century, memory was often conceived and used as a matter of teachable rules and routines. Today's
advertisements on "building your memory and empowering your
life" offer much the same instruction. There is nothing particularly
mysterious or self-enclosing about the old arts of memory as we
have come to understand them, thanks to Frances Yates, first of all,
and now to Mary Carruthers and Lina Bolzoni.8 Even so, studies of
pre-modern mnemonics have been only glancingly integrated and
absorbed in accounts of modern memory. Pierre Nora, for instance,
after acknowledging Frances Yates for his borrowed notion of "lieux
de memoire," proceeds as if the terminology were new and deploys
it only for what he regards as the emptied-out "memory places" of
our time. But these are not at all like the full topoi or loci of the
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance arts of memory, where memory
worked in and through physical sites generating references that
could be variously assembled and taken apart in making an oration
or a text. It is misleading to say, as Hacking does dismissively, that
"the whole point is to provide instant recall of any body of desired
facts, things, or texts" like a computer (Hacking 202). The ars
memorativa was an art of invention, both in the old sense of coming
on or into something (invenire) and in the sense of discovering
something new.
The old art of memory does not entail the kind of nostalgic
essentialism that affirms the reality of an origin by proclaiming its
loss. Yates was especially concerned with memory images, arranged
as in "theaters" of memory and, in hermetic traditions, capable of
figuring the harmonies between earthly and transcendental spheres.
Carruthers sees memory as nothing less than a master modality of
medieval culture. While she shows it encompassing everything from
heraldic devices to illuminated manuscripts, stained-glass windows,
and church gargoyles, she insists that writing was not at odds with
or detached from the mnemonic imaging. Medieval mnemonics did
not distinguish "between writing on the memory and writing on
some other surface"; rather than being an external support or implement of memory, the activity of writing was a kind of memorization
itself, or at least intimately bound up with it. So, on the one hand,
"the symbolic representations we call writing are no more than cues
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or triggers for the memorial 'representations'. . upon which human
cognition is based"; on the other hand, "anything that encodes
information in order to stimulate the memory to store or retrieve
information is 'writing,' whether it be alphabet, hieroglyph, ideogram, American Indian picture-writing, or Inca knot-writing"
(Carruthers 31-32).
As might be expected by now, there were parallels in older theories and practices of authentication. Whereas we are likely to regard
something as authentic insofar as it is categorically unique and selfreferential and ipso facto irreproducible, authenticity in an older
sense, and in many non-Western cultures, is produced by attestation, the witness of tradition, the appeal to assent. Authentication
in this sense is a process, a function of discussion and evaluation,
neither merely subjective nor conclusive once and for all.
I'm not sure how plausible this sounds. It will not inspire confidence that there are especially good examples in the canon law on
the authentication of relics and saints' lives. The procedures in.

clude assembling documents, lists, charters, and monuments of
whatever kind capable of throwing light on the relics or lives in
question; their examination by what we would call expert witnesses,
deliberation on the case, including the arguments of the Devil's
Advocate; the achievement of a degree of probability consistent
with good conscience and moral conviction about the outcome. If
contrary facts emerge, then the veracity of relic may be bracketed,
though it may continue to enjoy the respect to which past usage
entitles it.' In the view of perhaps the greatest of all Catholic authenticators, "it is not authority that makes for authenticity, it is
authenticity that makes authority in virtue of a conception according to which authority is never but a matter of assessed witnessing." It is "une persuasion et conversation commune que l' on a de
quelques faits.
." 'an opinion and shared conversation that one
has about some facts' (Mabillon 162). This is from the Benedictine
Jean Mabillon, who is commemorated next to Descartes in the
Pantheon, no doubt to the surprise of both had they known about it.
Another example is more familiar, though not necessarily better
understood. I'm thinking of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
Anglo-American law. Without reading Barbara Shapiro and other
legal historians, we might take it for granted that reasonable doubt
refers to doubts of reason by standards of demonstrative and logical certainty. Such are the standards toward which post-Cartesians
are drawn, despite real experience and better judgment. The point is
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol23/iss1/13
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that human affairs are actually too complicated and uncertain for
such demonstrations, and too morally fraught besides to be treated
like geometry or physical science. Together with the need for local
knowledge, this is, among other reasons, why Common Law mandates juries. In one classic formulation, "reasonable doubt" is
not merely possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is
that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the mind
in that
condition that the jurors cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of moral certainty of the truth of the charge
[that] the
evidence establishes the truth of the facts with a reasonable
and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment.
(Shapiro 24-25)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The judgment of conscience was not understood to be merely willful or prescribed by custom. It was supposed to be a rational decision, linked to the understanding and not just to the passions. Conscience had high commission and authority because its deliberations mattered more than abstract reason or physical science. Hence
the "common rule of authentic evidence" formulated at least by the
late seventeenth century was a cat's cradle of criteria at once pragmatic and fairly precise. It called for examining "the nature of the
evidence within common fame, tradition, and the writings of persons who related them, together with the number, concurrence, veracity and private characters of those persons
so that [without
actually being eyewitnesses] they were bound by all the rules of
historical faith, and right reason, to give credit to this [or that] his.

.

tory" (Shapiro 11).
Now my sketchy account will hardly convince anyone "beyond
a reasonable doubt" or otherwise. But it may be enough to suggest
ways out of the impasse of treating memory and authenticity so
narrowly that we are obliged either to turn cynical or to give up on
them altogether. These involve process, solicit varieties of evidence,
call for public and professional accountability. They entered the
historian's tool kit long ago under the old-fashioned title "historical
erudition" with quaint subtitles such as philology, diplomatic, and
codicology. Perhaps this is the fantasy of an early modern historian,
but it seems to me that the old grudits have something to show us
still.' Having already made a "linguistic turn," they could insist on
Published by New Prairie Press
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close reading and definition, while also taking it for granted that
language generated copious meanings that had to be interpreted
and contextualized. They were not, for all that, soft on reality, among
other reasons, because they also worked with marks, shards, and
traces as indices of distant pasts. They did not have easy lumping
words such as "culture," society," "experience," or, as Ian Hacking
thinks he has shown, "memory" to fudge the differences. They were
interdisciplinary besides: having relatively little evidence, they had
to use whatever material or method came to hand. Again avant la
lettre, they were "dialogic" and "self-reflexive," as Professor La Capra
would want the up-to-date historian to be, because their work was a
conversation among contending citations and the citizens of the
respublica literarum. The texts they wrote did not ride high over
the ballast of footnotes but were interrogated and open to interpellation in the work and play of cross-referencing, digression, excursus,
and quotation.
It's tempting to conclude with the postmodern mantra "back to
the future." But I don't believe that's ever possible or, even if it
were, necessary. After all, the kinds of attention and the skills I've
dwelt upon have not been repressed awaiting a return so much as
marginalized, literally so when consigned to the sidelines as preliminary and propadeutic or relegated to our footnotes or, more likely in
the current publishing economy, endnotes. My proposal, in the end,
is a modest one: that historians and other students of history and
memory bring to the front and center the critical erudition of assessment, research, and accountability that lie on the sides and bottom
of our work.

Notes
For France and a very large literature, I limit myself to citing: Pierre
Nora, Les lieux de memoire; Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple
Personality and the Sciences of Memory, 198-209; Richard Terdiman, Present
Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis. The most important surveys include Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of
Tradition in American Culture; John R. Gillis, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, 1994); Raphael Samuel, Theatres of
Memory, vol. 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture ; and David
Lowenthal's two books, The Past is a Foreign Country and Possessed by
the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History.
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2. See Roediger.
3. See Friedlander.

4. New York Times, Sunday, March 13, 1996, H-15.
5. See, for instance, Marshall Berman, Rousseau and the Politics ofAuthenticity and All That's Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of the Modern.

6. See Halbwachs 84.
7. See Hutton.
8. See Yates, The Art of Memory; Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory:
A Study in Medieval Culture; Lina Bolzoni, La stanza della memoria: modelli
letterari e iconografici nell'eta della stampa.
9. See Dooley.
10.

develop this view in the introduction to The New Erudition, 1-12.

I
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